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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 16-3685
___________
WALTER BROWN,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN PIKE COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY; SGT. FRAWLEY;
E. WENZEL, Grievance Coordinator
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-15-cv-02373)
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 21, 2017
Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: July 25, 2017)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
Walter Brown appeals, pro se and in forma pauperis, the District Court’s final
order dismissing with prejudice his complaint. We will affirm.
*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Brown filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania alleging that his due process and First Amendment rights were violated
when Pike County Correctional Facility (PCCF) Warden Craig A. Lowe, Sargeant
Frawley, and Grievance Coordinator E. Wenzel improperly opened and withheld his legal
mail for several months, and withheld his cell phone and cash. Specifically, Brown
alleged that upon being transferred back to PCCF from another facility, he was informed
that a large amount of legal mail was waiting for him from the past few months, and it
had been opened prior to his receipt. Brown alleged that he was thus prevented from
responding to relevant matters in his underlying state criminal proceedings and
accordingly missed deadlines and had his filings dismissed, denied, or waived.
The Magistrate Judge screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and
recommended that (1) the complaint be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted, and (2) leave to amend be denied. Over
Brown’s objections, the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations
and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Brown timely appealed.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and review de novo the District
Court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). In doing so we accept as true all factual allegations and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. Id. We may affirm on any basis
supported by the record. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir.1999).
Denial of leave to amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d
107, 121 (3d Cir. 2000).
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Brown alleged that his due process rights were violated when Defendants withheld
his legal and personal mail and confiscated his cell phone and cash. Deprivation of
inmate property by prison officials – whether intentional or unintentional – does not
violate the Due Process clause if adequate post-deprivation remedies exist. Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). Adequate post-deprivation remedies include prison
grievance programs and state tort law. See id.; see also Tillman v. Lebanon Cty. Corr.
Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 422 (3d Cir. 2000); Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 179-81
(3d Cir. 1997).
Here, a prison grievance program existed, and Brown utilized it. So an adequate
post-deprivation remedy existed, and Brown’s due process claim is not cognizable. See
Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533; Tillman, 221 F.3d at 422. Even if Brown amended his
complaint to state that the internal prison grievance procedure is constitutionally
inadequate, Pennsylvania’s state tort law would provide an additional adequate remedy.
See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8542(a); 8550. Thus, the District Court was within its discretion
to deny leave to amend. See Alvin, 227 F.3d at 121.
Brown also alleged that Defendants violated his First Amendment right of access
to the courts. Brown specifically alleged that Defendants did not timely deliver legal
mail relating to an underlying state criminal suit, resulting in his motions and a petition in
that suit being denied or dismissed; he also asserts that he “lost the opportunity to decide
on any plea agreements.” Where a prisoner asserts that defendants’ actions have
inhibited his opportunity to present a past legal claim, he must show (1) that he suffered
actual injury—i.e., the chance to pursue a nonfrivolous or arguable underlying claim; and
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(2) that no remedy may be awarded as recompense for the lost claim other than in the
present denial-of-access suit. Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008).
Appointment of counsel is sufficient to provide prisoners with meaningful access to the
courts. Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1042 (3d Cir. 1988).
Here, Brown was represented by counsel in the underlying state suit during the
relevant time period, and counsel filed motions and a brief in the matter during this time.
Thus Brown had meaningful access to the courts. See Id. Brown (with the assistance of
counsel) also pleaded guilty in the underlying state criminal case several months after
receiving his mail. Brown never asserted that the withheld legal documents impaired his
ability to enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea several months after their return. Nor
does he describe his alleged underlying claims with sufficient specificity to show
anything beyond a “mere hope.” See Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205-06. Thus, he has not
shown any actual injury. Nothing in his brief compels a different conclusion, nor does
anything in his brief show that the District Court abused its discretion in denying leave to
amend.
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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